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Abstract 
T h e s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m m e tha t h i n g e s on s t a t e 
'min imal i sm' and private investment- led growth is likely to end 
up in stabilisation problem since development experience suggest 
part icularly slow speed of ad jus tment on the supply side by Indian 
big private capi ta l . The p rog ramme so long it ignores market-
adjustment programme in the non-formal traded goods sector would 
further dampen economic development . Moreover, market reform 
without human development that ultimately extends peoples ' choice 
is a misnomer. West Bengal ' s comparat ive disadvantage vis-a-vis 
other states in human development is likely to hinder capital inflow. 
Briefly, the dominant concept of modernisat ion should lake lessons 
from the post colonial development experience of the Asian NICs. 
INDUSTRIALISATION P R O G R A M M E IN W E S T 
BENGAL : POLICY AND T H E P R O B L E M S — 
SOME LESSONS FROM NEWLY 
INDUSTRIALISING COUNTRIES IN ASIA 
The central government , and fol lowing in the foots teps the 
Government of West Bengal almost unequivocally resound the same 
rhetoric of 'development ' that has been ampl i f ied in the l i terature 
produced by the two giant global insti tutions of 'economics s tudies ' , 
viz., the World Bank and IMF, during the last couple of years. The 
essence of the growth model suggested by the Fund/Bank is that it 
is the inward-oriented trade strategies - in income growth, export 
growth, employment , and sav ings - tha t acted as the greates t 
s tumbling-block on the road to modernisa t ion (see, e .g., World 
Development Report 1987). The 'new' development economics also 
question the role of government intervention, and suggests "state 
m i n i m a l i s m ' . I n t e r v e n t i o n has been e q u a t e d with n u m e r o u s 
d is tor t ions in the economy : most deve lop ing e c o n o m i e s rely 
extensively on private ownership and markets , but temper this with 
substantial interventions to inf luence the way marke ts work. Once 
the cap i t a l m a r k e t s a re f r eed f rom al l so r t s of g o v e r n m e n t 
regula t ions , the s tate owned en te rp r i s e s would turn out to be 
u n e c o n o m i c and the a r g u m e n t tha t p u b l i c i n i t i a t i v e s in the 
developing economies are substi tutes for lack of pr ivate init iat ives 
in high capital intensive and long-gestat ion projects , no longer 
holds good. Third, with public enterpr ises increas ingly viewed as 
an inef f ic ient drag on the economy, p r iva t i sa t ion now f igures 
prominent ly in the programme of s tructural reform sponsored by 
the World Bank/IMF. On the whole, once the 'controls ' arc removed, 
the rate of domestic saving supposedly would cease to be the crucial 
determinant of growth and development . Further , the freely mobile 
in te rna t iona l capi tal would render the concept of independent 
' technology policy' by any nat ional government a rchaic . 
The earlier draft was presented at the national seminar on the 'Economy of West 
Bengal' held at Jadavpur University during 24-25 March. 1995. I am grateful to 
Santosh Bhattacharya and all other participants for helpful comments. I am also 
thankful to Nirmala Banerjee. 
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We begin by considering some broad aspects of development of 
industr ies in West Bengal. Since the inception of modern factory-
based industry in the mid-nineteenth century a regional clustering 
of i n d u s t r i e s had occur red . T h e o w n e r s h i p of m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
industr ies in different regions a lso conformed to a pat tern. In fact 
at the time of independence a regional capitalist class had developed 
to an extent in western India only. In south India and Bengal there 
were incipient s t irr ing of an indigenous business class, but the 
Marwaris in the east were both mercant i le in spirit and separate 
from the population of the region to which they had migra ted . 
Consequently, when planned development was inaugurated it was these 
areas which both had some industrial growdi (largely depending on die 
nature of industry-cluster) and a regional bourgeoisie that were able to 
draw further investments to these regions. This aggravated regional 
disparities (Baneijee and Ghosh, 1988). 
In eas tern India, espec ia l ly Benga l , as long as the impor t 
substitution phase was not complete and foreign capital remained 
dominant , the region remained advanced industrially. But with die 
displacement and decline of European capital and the obsolescence 
of the product mix that the region used to produce, the industrial 
sector of the region plunged into a crisis which still persists. The 
Marwar i cap i ta l i s t s who rep laced the Bri t ish had ne i ther the 
legit imacy nor the hegemonic position to be the representat ives of 
the r eg ion . They could n e i t h e r i d e n t i f y with nor pro jec t the 
a s p i r a t i o n s of the region be fore the cen t ra l gove rnmen t . The 
intermediate class which had dominated the state 's politics has been 
able to exercise power through a certain cultural hegemony but 
dissociated from productive enterpr ise . Moreover, their political 
supremacy has not jeopardized the accumulat ion of the Marwaris 
and other non-indigenous sections of the capitalist class in Bengal 
thus making for a situation of accommodat ion between the two 
classes. In contrast, the emergence of an integrated and indigenous 
cap i t a l i s t c lass in western Ind i a has p rov ided a boost to the 
development process of the region. Their hegemonic presence has 
enabled the region to ar t iculate its aspira t ions before the Union 
Government. As a result, within the federal structure it has attracted 
more public resources for its development . 
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It is found that generally speaking, industr ies in West Bengal 
faced stagnat ion. The problem although became acute since the 
middle of the 1970s a slow process leading to industr ial s tagnation 
was operative since the mid-1950s. West Bengal even at the end of 
(lie 1950s was second among the industrial ly developed states in 
India. However, the assumption that the developed region should 
grow faster than the nat ional average because the developed region 
provides certain economies that arises largely from 'agglomerat ion ' 
failed to hold in this case of West Bengal . The overall per formance 
of the s tate 's organised manufac tur ing was largely the outcome of 
a much lower rate of growth of the large scale sector (ASI-Census 
Sec to r ) than tha t at the a l l - I n d i a l eve l . T h e m e d i u m s c a l e 
manufactur ing (ASI-sample Sector), on the other hand, maintained 
a h igher than na t iona l ave rage g rowth ra te in West Benga l . 
However, as the relative weight of the medium scale sector was 
low, the dynamism in this sector failed to give an impetus to the 
overall growth prosperi ty of tlie manufac tur ing sector in the state. 
The balance sheets, and profi ts and loss accounts of qui te a 
sizeable numbers of small , medium and large scale f i rms in West 
Bengal ' s chemical and electrical goods industries - the two major 
industries whose relative importance in the country's manufactur ing 
sector have signif icantly increased since the mid-1960s - have been 
analysed, for the period from 1960 to 1975 (Banerjee, 1983). And, 
we find that investment in the large and the foreign subsidiary 
sectors, dur ing the period, const i tuted only a small par t of the 
internally generated funds, and was not commensurate to the values 
of the variables that are important in the calculation of 'bus iness 
re turns ' . The relatively high rate of accumulation in the these two 
sectors perhaps would indicate that the labour situation was hardly 
the reason behind the migration of big capital, so to say. The greater 
the a l l - Ind ia spread of large bus ines s -houses the more migh t 
part icular areas under thir control suffer because the greater would 
their investment policies tend to be influenced by their India-wide 
profi tabil i ty considerat ions and their strategic considera t ions for 
pleasing powerful political grouping in the central government -
and in some cases, the regionally powerful political satraps. On the 
whole, the small and medium manufac tur ing sector in West Bengal 
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b e c a m e p o t e n t i a l l y m o r e i m p o r t a n t . But t he c o n c e p t of 
modernisation which is essentially urban biased and centred around 
heavy industry - based industr ia l isa t ion, that has dominated the 
guid ing p r inc ip l e s of the s tate government failed to evoke an 
alternative development trajectory that is viable in economy, feasible 
in society, and acceptable in politics. This has been eleborated in Sections 
II and IV. 
Secondly, there is the general supposition that the Fund/Bank 
prescription of 's tate min ima l i sm ' would induce a 'converging ' or 
' ca tching-up ' t rend, res t ing on indigenous big private as well as 
foreign capital , at an uniform rate in all the third world economies 
which part icularly had long experience of colonial rule. However, 
the foreign capital did not behave in the same manner in Chile as 
it did, for instance, in China largely due to the 'na ture ' of the 
indigenous capital, and the complementary role of the state. Besides, 
of the four East Asian newly industr ia l is ing economies (NIEs) that 
emerged as the most dynamic and competitive countries, viz., South 
Korea, Ta iwan, and the two c i ty-s ta tes , i .e . , Hong Kong and 
Singapore, Korea seems to be most interventionist . She protected 
in fan t i ndus t r i e s widely, d i rec ted resource a l loca t ion , t ight ly 
regulated inward foreign investment and created giant f irms to 
spearhead its indus t r ia l deepening and export drive (see, e.g. , 
Amsden, 1989). Indian situation, dur ing the pre-reform period, was 
very much alike. The concentrat ion and centralisation of Indian 
private capital, too showed discrete tendencies despite MRTP/FERA 
acts. Yet, as it is hypothesized (see, e.g., Nayyar, 1994), many Indian 
ent repreneurs , in fact , have revealed their prcferance for rents 
instead of prof i ts or for trading instead of manufacturing activities. 
Few ent repreneurs have sought to promote R and D. However, in 
the context of pr ivate investment- led expansion, it is perhaps the 
state action to discipl ining private capital and the specific response 
of the latter to various public policies that distinguish the countries 
from each other. Of course, the experience of development in some 
of the far eastern Asian countries ought to be treated as potential 
lessons, keeping in mind that economic development, or successful 
transition growth, is a complex mosaic and no single part of it can 
real ly be t rea ted in i so la t ion . However, given the inves tment 
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c l imate , h is tor ica l p rocesses p r e c e d i n g the t ake -o f f , r esource 
endowment (material as well as human) , economic as well as social 
insti tutions, a comparat ive ana lys i s would enable us to unders tand 
where exact ly the economy needs in t e rven t ion , what k inds of 
ins t i tu t iona l changes are nece s sa ry before m a k i n g any pol icy 
prescription effective, why changes in a few domains are necessarv 
while others may continue, etc. 
The idea that underdevelopment is a problem of too little saving 
is deeply embedded in the history of development economics . The 
argument seems simple enough, capital accumulat ion is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for growth, and capital accumulat ion is 
almost synonymous with saving, the route to development is then 
one of ra is ing saving ra t ios . T h e r e are now m a n y deve lop ing 
countries with saving rates that would have seemed unimaginably 
high to the development economis ts of the 1950s. In the decade of 
1980s, the gross national saving of the low-income economies , on 
an average, was 24 per cent plus, of GNP, which was higher than 
that of the middle- income economies (World Development Report 
1990 : Table A.7). However, across countr ies there is at best only 
very weak relation between saving and growth, a l though there is 
found to have a very high cross-country correlat ion between saving 
and investment. It is perhaps the productivity of investment that is 
crucial, not its volume (Deaton, 1989; Gersovitz, 1988). In Section 
III, the case of electronics industry has been discussed to highl ight 
the i s sue tha t all d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s may need a c c e s s to 
considerable inflows of foreign technology, but import in the form 
of capi ta l equipment or l i cens ing , requ i res much larger local 
absorpt ive effort than in the form of direct foreign investment . In 
general , without enhancing the local absorpt ive capacity the speed 
of adjustment on the supply side is bound to be slow, part icular ly 
in the technology-intensive traded goods sector, and which may 
ult imately affect the macro economic stabilisation programme. The 
slow pace of development of the electronics industry at the all-
India level notwithstanding the relatively poor performance of West 
Bengal vis-a-vis other states is the mat ter in Sect ion IV. And, 
Sec t ion V d i s c u s s e s a few i s s u e s r e l a t e d to West B e n g a l ' s 
compe t i t i ve d i sadvan tage vis-a-vis s t a tes in Ind ia , so far as 
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industrial investment is concerned. 
II 
Since the mid 1970s , t he re ha s been a s t eady g r o w t h of 
sericulture in developing countries. Since silk production is a labour 
in tens ive ac t iv i ty e spec ia l ly in its in i t i a l a g r i c u l t u r a l phase , 
sericulture has either d isappeared or on the wane in most of the 
developed countries. Th is is due to high opportuni ty cost of labour 
as compared to other ac t iv i t ies in agr icu l tu re or industry, and 
simultaneously to price compit i t ion from low-wage silk producing 
countries. In recent t imes, the decl ine of the silk production in 
Japan has made India the second largest raw silk producer with 
about 16 per cent share in the world outputs.2 China by contr ibuting 
about 63 per cent to the aggregate world outputs occupies the pr ide 
of place while Japan is the third largest producer with a share of 
6.3 per cent, in 1992. 
India has been able to increase her silk goods exports f rom Rs. 
255 crore in 1987/8, to Rs. 789.10 crore in 1993/4 (at the trend 
rate of growth of 17.01 per cent per annum). As percentage of 
India ' s total export earnings , silk remained at a steady level of 1.4 
to 1.6, during 1987/8 - 1993/4 (Source : DGCI&S). The exports to 
USA alone constituted 36.4 per cent of the total value of exports in 
1993/4. The USA, UK, and the United Germany together consumed 
more than 63 per cent of the aggregate silk exports. Of course, one 
may be skeptic about the future trend but that uncertainty is true of 
all manufactured consumer goods, part icularly when those are 'up-
market ' products like the silk goods. In brief, what we witness is a 
steady growth in the world market for silk goods, and India is 
gaining impor tance s ince some of the producing count r ies are 
withdrawing from it; the most recent example being that of South 
Korea! 
West Bengal by virtue of being die second largest silk producing 
state in India, next to Karnataka, had the intit ial advantage to gain 
Source : Japan Raw Silk and Sugar Stabilization Agency, as quoted in Huan, el. 
al. (1994). ' 
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from (lie current spurt in demand . Silk production (we consider, 
here, mulberry silk only) inc luding ser icul ture consists of a chain 
of act ivi t ies , viz. , mu lbe r ry cu l t iva t ion , seed and commerc ia l 
silkworm rearing, reeling, sp inn ing/ twis t ing , and f inal ly weaving. 
This entire process of silk product ion in West Bengal is p r imar i fy 
located in rural h in t e r l ands , and which provides employment , 
directly and indirectly, to near ly a mill ion of the rural workforce! 
The development and growth of the sector is thus very crucial, more 
part icularly when labour absorpt ion capact iy of the agrcul tura l 
sector has almost reached its nadi r . 
The optimum rate of return in ser icul ture (mulberry plantat ion 
and s i lkworm r e a r i n g ) is f ound to be much h ig h e r than any 
commonly pract ised crop produc t ion in West Bengal ( the cost 
calculation includes the costs of family labour at the prevai l ing 
wage rate). The rich soil of the state yields the highest ra te of 
mulberry per unit of land, in India, and that too, under ra infed 
c o n d i t i o n . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , u n l i k e in say, K a r n a t a k a , the 
cultivation in the state is concentra ted in a very limited pockets 
only. The district of Malda a lone const i tutes about 50 per cent of 
the mulberry cult ivation, and the bulk of the rest are shared by 
Murshidabad and Birbhum . Besides, ser icul ture in West Bengal is 
pa r t i cu la r ly cha rac t e r i z ed by the p r e d o m i n a n c e of smal l and 
marginal cultivators. This is qui te in contrast to, say, Karna taka 
where the size of ser icul ture is hardly correlated with the rural 
c l a ss h i e r a r c h y . T h e a v e r a g e m u l b e r r y land per c u l t i v a t i n g 
household is only one-third of an acre in West Bengal. One of the 
reasons is, of course, the nature of the required capital investments. 
There is pract ical ly no marke t for mulberry leaves, and all the 
mulberry cult ivators are in turn the si lkoworm rearers, too. 
Land, labour (physical, and the volume of si lkworm ' seeds ' ) , 
and fixed capital (mainly in the form of rearing space and other 
complementary equipments like racks, rearing trays) maintain strict 
complementar i ty (i.e., zero subst i tutabi l i ty) . In other words, in the 
short run (here is only one method of production conforming to the 
Leontief production funct ion. In the long run expansion of output 
may be ob ta ined by va ry ing al l the f ac to r s , but in d i f f e r e n t 
p ropor t ions ( i .e . , n o n - h o m o g e n e o u s p roduc t ion f u n c t i o n ) . In 
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part icular , the rearing space can be created only in 'ba tches ' . Thus 
if the f ixed cap i ta l is a l r e a d y fu l l y employed , any m a r g i n a l 
expans ion of mulber ry cu l t iva t ion would not be cost e f f i c ien t . 
However, these character is t ics of production only partially expla ins 
the small average size of plantat ion. The Muslims and the scheduled 
castes who together cons t i t u t e s overwhelming major i ty of the 
sericul turis ts incidental ly hold not only small plots of agricul tural 
lands which are uneconomic for the cultivation of the major crops 
but often marginal lands (in terms of soil quality) in respective 
inauzas . Thus , in most of the a reas of h igh-concen t ra t ion of 
se r i cu l tu re , f u r t h e r expans ion of mu lbe r ry cul t ivat ion (which 
requires well-drained high lands) seems to be difficult without the 
part icipat ion of the substant ia l peasants . On the whole, despi te 
comparat ively high rate of return per unit of land the expansion of 
mulberry acreage in West Bengal remained substantially low. 
S e r i c u l t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y the s i lkworm rear ing is a labour 
i n t ens ive ac t iv i ty , and it r equ i r e s in tens ive superv i s ion . The 
s u p e r v i s i o n cos t m i n i m i z a t i o n d e p e n d s c r u c i a l l y on t h e 
par t ic ipa t ion of fami ly labour . The fami ly labour, pa r t i cu la r ly 
women in the agricul turis t famil ies , being engaged in various post-
harvest foodcrops processing act ivi t ies there is hardly any residual 
labour-t ime in such fami l ies to be engaged in rearing. But given 
the avai labi l i ty of surplus labour in the slack agricultural seasons, 
and given the fact that the rear ing 'crop ' schedules (four to five 
times in a year) do not over lap that of foodcrop cultivation, the 
relatively high supervision cost, if weighed against the lower costs 
of h i r ing labour, perhaps does not explain the sluggish growth in 
ser icul ture . Often the commerc ia l i sa t ion process in rural West 
Bengal is h igh l igh ted on the basis of higher yield-rates of the 
foodcrops . But, if r e l a t i ve p r i ce induced c rop-subs t i tu t ion is 
considered as one of the indicators of commercialistion one would 
certainly wonder why sericul ture, unl ike in Karnataka, Tamilnadu 
or A n d h r a P r a d e s h , h a s f a i l e d to a t t r a c t c a p i t a l a n d 
ent repreneurship in West Bengal . 
As there is vir tually no au tonomous market for mulberry leaves, 
mulberry plantat ion and the silkworm rear ing together consti tutes 
one composite unit of product ion. Further , the use of the owned 
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cocoon outputs as inputs in owned reeling (producing silk yarn) 
units is quite widespread, because of the highly exploi tat ive cocoon 
market. Most of the rearer households having very l imited access 
to resources other than own labour apply very crude methods to 
reeling cocoons into silk yarn, result ing in low yield as well as low 
grades of yarn. It is also found that the reeling uni ts which have 
installed improved machinery prefer not to produce f iner counts of 
yarn. It is basically the underdevelopment of the yarn market which 
dissuades the producers from under taking opt imum ut i l izat ion of 
the improved technique of production. The raw silk market , in its 
proper sense, is practical ly non-exis tent . Overwhelming major i ty 
of the weavers are not i* a position to purchase directly f rom the 
reelcrs, even if the reel ing centre was ad jacent to the weaving 
centre. A battery of intermediaries operate in-between die producers 
and the users. The 'marke t ' is such that the finer counts yarn do 
not fetch proport ionally higher prices. The coarser yarn f ind ready 
markets in most of the weaving centres except in places such as 
Bishnupur (Bankura) which has specialized in up-market products 
like Baluchari sarees. The result is a very high proport ion of low 
graded silk materials in the aggregate output of West Bengal . The 
weaving of better textured materials often requires import of yarn 
from other states, mainly from Karnataka. On the one hand , West 
Bengal is losing its export markets to other states. On the other 
hand, the low graded mater ia ls not being proport ional ly cheaper 
fail to have expanded domestic market . Here again, despite active 
role of such government sponsored apex cooperat ive agencies as 
Tantuja, Tantushree the local private silk merchants have a larger 
share of the market. The primary reason being that these private 
silk merchants have effectively linked up the production as well as 
consumption loans with the outputs of the weavers. 
Let us look at Karnataka which is not only the largest producer 
of silk and silk goods but the largest producer of, to note, finer 
counts yarn. As early as in 1959, the state goverment (Depar tment 
of Sericulture) established the first regulated cocoon market (at 
Ramnagaram) which was subsequently followed by a series of such 
markets in arcs of concentrat ion scattered across the state. Now, 
almost all of the cocoons are transacted through these very effective 
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auction markets where the public authori ty 's role has been very 
crucial. The latter not only provides the required inf ras t ruct re but 
also acts as the arbi t ra tor . Using mass media, the government tries 
to min imize the ' i n fo rmat ion gap ' between the buyers and the 
sellers, of not only cocoons but of yarn as well. The process of 
d i s s e m i n a t i o n of k n o w l e d g e f rom labora to ry to the f i e lds in 
Karna t aka is a l so no tewor thy , which has effected large scale 
adoption of high yielding variety of mulberry, its improved method 
of cultivation, improved method of rearing of hi-yielding silkworms, 
and also improved techniques of reel ing. As a result , a l though 
numerical ly the poorer households dominate the sector yet it is 
difficult to identify ser icul ture, there with poor peasant e c o n o m y -
large scale fa rming are quite frequent alongside of the average scale 
of operation on about 0 .66 acre of land. Given the lower yield-rate 
of mulberry, the growth phenomenon in Karnataka certainly points 
to a different process of commercial isat ion as compared to that in 
West Bengal.3 
With an aim to encourage sericul ture development in India by 
fostering growth in prodcut ion, productivity and product quality, 
the National Ser icul ture Project (NSP) was launched in 1989 by 
the Government of India (Central Silk Board) with assistance of 
an IDA credit of SDR 113.8 million (equivalent to US S 147 million) 
and a Swiss Development Cooperat ion grant of SwF 40 million 
(US $ 25 mil l ion) (which were subsequently enhanced), and which 
is scheduled to be completed by end - 1996. The project supports a 
wide va r ie ty of a c t i v i t i e s in the pub l ic and p r iva te sec tors , 
including : (a) credit to mulberry farmers, silkworm rearers and 
silk reelers; (b) facilit ies for production of silkworm eggs and young 
si lkworms (chawkie); (c) inst i tut ional support including training, 
From my own experience of working, in connection with the sericulture development 
project for a couple of years, with the state department of sericulture in both 
Karnataka and West Bengal, 1 would rather emphasise on the aspect of 'motivation' 
than on the token participation of the government in the development process. One 
has to look into the relationship between the form of governance and economic 
development (which has recently become an alluring area of research, see, e.g., 
Meier, 1991). The bureaucracy in the high-concentration sericulture district of 
Malda is found to be much more active than in. say. Cooch Behar (a less developed 
sericulture district). But this does not tell us about the causality 
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technical assistance, monitoring and evaluation and administrat ion; 
(d) extension; (e) research; and (f) marke t ing and qual i ty testing. 
The project gives special emphas is to women and / the poor. The 
project is being implemented in Ta in i lnadu , A n d h r a Pradesh , 
Karnataka, West Bengal, Jaininu and Kashmir and in pilot districts 
of 12 other states. By the end of 1994 (i .e. , the f i f th year), the 
project targets were more than fu l f i l led in Tamil Nadu, Karna taka 
and Andhra Pradesh while the implementa t ion in West Bengal 
remained far behind the schedule of the project targets within the 
time f rame (see the Review Reports of the World Bank/SDC); the 
' qua l i t y ' of implementa t ion a l so is open to ques t ion (see the 
Beneficiary Assessment Reports by CSSSC). 
A bill on the regulation of product ion, supply, distr ibution and 
sale of silkworm seeds, cocoon and silk yarn in West Bengal was 
d rawn up in Apr i l 1988. A n d on ly by the end of 1992 the 
Depar tment of Ser icu l ture (DOS) was able to set up the first 
regulated market . Since then a few regulated markets have been 
set up by the DOS in the the dis t r ic ts of Malda, Murshidabad and 
B i r b h u m . F o l l o w i n g these a t t e m p t s , the K h a d i a n d V i l l age 
I n d u s t r i e s C o m m i s s i o n ( K V I C ) a n d t h e K h a d i a n d V i l l a g e 
Industries Board (KVIB) have issued circulars instructing the khadi 
societies to purchase their r equ i r emen t s of cocoons f rom these 
markets . Despite having the assured par t ic ipa t ion of these big 
corporate potential buyers in the regulated markets the volumes of 
t ransac t ions so far remained abysmal ly poor in a lmos t all the 
markets . One of the reasons, of course, is that these marke ts are 
not comparable to the typical well managed market in Karnataka . 
These markets do not operate on all the consecutive days during 
the harvest time, and are organized by the DOS off ic ia ls only on 
request from the bulk purchasers . The sellers thus find it diff icul t 
to synchronize their schedules with that of the market . Secondly, 
the very few buyers who appear in the market often found to be 
colluding with each other and thus keeping the price depressed. 
One may expect some kind of intervention from the public authori ty 
but the problem is likely to persist so long as the buyers, in these 
markets, are few. The greatest hurd le in making the p rogramme a 
success seems to be the strong l inkage between product ion and 
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market ing of outputs through the credit mechan i sm, and other 
informal ' t i e s ' . 
Whi le credi t and output ma rke t s pose ser ious p rob lems to 
productivity increase, the role of the state government agencies 
who act in between the government research organisation and the 
main actors at the grassroots level is subjected to a lot of cri t icism. 
The pyramidical s tructure of information flow from the laboratory 
to the government depar tment(s) and then down to the recipients 
through intermediate channels , instead of a direct association in 
between the lab and the labour, often led to disf iguring of the basic 
information. Ult imately the cult ivators have to incur the costs of 
mis- informat ion. The perpetuity of which made them resistant to 
technological improvement . 
The condition of production in silk weaving in the state is not 
much differrent f rom those in the backward linked sectors. Almost 
the entire output is produced with tradit ional wooden handlooms, 
excepting the few by the Jacquard looms in Bishnupur (producing 
Dalucliari sarees). Capital though it appears as a coercive social 
re la t ion, has not been the p r inc ipa l means of product ion (see 
Bane r j ee , 1994) . T h e h o u s e h o l d o r g a n i z a t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n 
constitutes the ' core ' ; yet its independent operation is found to be 
n o n - v i a b l e . T h e c o s t - e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of t he 
households is linked up with the market by the putters-out, viz., 
the private silk merchants , and the people 's as well as other non-
governmental organizat ions (NGOs) patronized by the state. The 
system despite generating considerable surplus has kept the art isan's 
income depressed. 
Out of about 265 societies in the state, only 18 are cooperatives, 
and they together consti tuted about one-third of the annual outputs 
of finished silk of all the societies, during 1990-93, in fact, the 
share of the cooperat ive societies in the aggregate of societ ies ' 
outputs decl ined dur ing the per iod . The other form of society 
organization is that which the West Bengal Societies Registration 
Act, 1961 allows, any seven or more individuals to form a society 
for charitable purposes. Incidentally, most of the charitable societies 
engaged in weaving and/or reeling are floated with members who 
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arc closely related to each other, and thus largely consti tute family-
based bus iness o rgan iza t ions . The large number? of c h a r i t a b l e 
societ ies in the state together with the pr ivate silk m e r c h a n t s 
effectively determines the condit ions of silk product ion. The bulk 
of the large amount of subsidies and ' so f t ' loans provided to the 
societies by the central government , through KVIC, have in fact 
gone to die chari table societies who performance-wise , in so many 
ways, a re i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f rom the p r i va t e s i lk m e r c h a n t s 
ope ra t i ng as p u t t e r s - o u t . T h e khad i p r o g r a m m e , in o r d e r to 
effectively organize the poor handloom weavers and protect them 
from the exploi ta t ive mechan i sm of an underdeveloped marke t 
institution has, in fact, proliferated an al ternat ive insti tution which 
is not endowed with any visible dynamic element in it. 
In a labour surplus economy, generally, the unpaid proport ion 
of labour , which is nothing but self-exploi tat ion, congealed in the 
commodity produced is considerably high. And that is the major 
source of competi t ive advantage of the production line. However, 
the capacity of this household organizat ion is res t r ic ted by the 
distribution of initial endowments. They hardly generate any surplus 
over and above their own subsistence which would be ut i l ized as 
working capital . In fact, most of the silk weavers ' ea rn ings are 
be low the pover ty l ine . They possess h a r d l y any m a r k e t a b l e 
collateral asset which would have yielded them the ent i t lement to 
seek insti tutional f inance. Since their product ive capaci ty remain 
grossly underuti l ized under the society form of organiza t ion , due 
to the resources crunch of pa r t i cu la r ly the coopera t ives , thei r 
independent attempt to replenish that with borrowings f rom private 
credi t marke t expose them fu r the r to acute unequal e x c h a n g e 
Notwithstanding, there is no discernible decline in the number=of 
handloom units. Instead, there are newer addit ions. Of course, the 
new entrants into this sector are mostly weavers by caste. But since 
most of them are found to be at their 20 's and most of them are 
educated (at least high school-passed), and also since their family 
had discontinued the job long before, there was necessarily no 'pull-
forces for them to re-enter into this business unless some other 
economic compulsions were there. The fact that they are working 
at a comparatively much low wage yet they have no effect ive union 
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aga ins t their mas t e r s docs ind ica te the weak barga in ing posi t ion 
of these weavers . They have become only a marginal e lement in 
the product ive process and arc l iable to be often unemployed or 
underemployed, and thus they could do lit t le to inconvenience their 
mas te r s by w i t h h o l d i n g the i r labour . Because of their hab i tua l 
poverty they feel l i t t le t empta t ion to migra te , also. The addi t iona l 
advantage in die hand loom weaving indust ry is that it serves largely 
to occupy par t of the f a m i l y for par t of the time; fa ther , mothe r , 
wife and ch i ld ren , could all sha re in the work which would be 
carr ied on in the home i tse l f . 
The g o v e r n m e n t ' s ro l e is p r i m a r i l y conf ined to g iv ing legal 
recogni t ion to the socie ty form of o rgan iza t ion , and occas iona l 
d is t r ibut ion of subs id ies , etc . , to the societ ies . Even within the 
n a r r o w b o u n d a r i e s of a c t i o n the l a c k a d a i s i c a l a t t i t u d e of the 
government to this indus t r i a l outwork has been quite p ronounced , 
not only r ega rd ing the rev iew of, but a lso in the implementa t ion of 
the stated pol ic ies . O r g a n i z a t i o n s like Tantuja , Tantusree of the 
West Bengal Handloom and Powerloom Development Corpora t ion 
Ltd, and the West Bengal Sta te Handloom Weavers ' Coopera t ive 
Society Ltd. (Apex Society) do provide the weavers ' o rgan iza t ions 
with, l imi ted though , m a r k e t i n g out le ts . However, mos t of the 
outputs are t ransacted between them on credi t , and the r epaymen t s 
take three to seven m o n t h s and even longer time than that, leavino 
them with acute shor tage of working capi ta l . Moreover, fo l lowing 
the government not i f ica t ions , the societies allow 'festival d iscounts ' 
( r eba tes ) on the i r p r o d u c t s which a re supposed to be r e a d i l y 
reimbursed by the apex body. However, par t icular ly the KVIB West 
Bengal as compared to the KVIC owes a huge sums of money to its 
aff i l ia ted societ ies on that account which has accumulated over last 
couple of years . The financial ins t i tu t ions , on the other hand are 
v e r y r e l u c t a n t t o e x t e n d c r e d i t t o t he s o c i e t i e s w h o s e 
c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s is be ing se r ious ly ques t ioned whi le the apex 
organizat ion (KVIC), as par t of the reforms programme, has stopped 
f lowing credi t d i rect ly to the societ ies . Consequently, the system 
of t r ansac t ions -on-c red i t in this sector as well as in the ups t ream 
product ion l ines has p r ec ip i t a t ed with more s t rength (for m o r e 
details , see Baner jee , 1994) . 
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The Eighth Plan document states : 'main objective of khadi and 
village industries (KVI) programmes dur ing the Eighth Plan would 
be to create additional employment opportuni t ies in the non- fa rm 
sector and to ensure increased wages/earnings to rural workers . 
For this purpose, it would be necessary to reorient khadi programme 
and identify thrust areas among village industr ies" (GOI, Planning 
Commission, 1992 : Vol. II, p.135). But the reorientat ion of the 
current programme in desirable directions seems to be quite difficult 
task since only very l imited ' in format ion ' on the detai led aspects 
of the func t ion ing of the khadi socie t ies are ava i l ab l e to the 
otherwise huge sized apex organizat ions, viz., KVIC and KVIB. 
Even on the numbers of ope ra t ing soc ie t i e s the i n f o r m a t i o n 
available to the two organizat ions differ considerably. The state of 
af fa i rs of technical eduation in the textile college also calls for a 
review : al though handlooms predominate the weaving sector in 
the s t a t e the c u r r i c u l a h a r d l y r e f l e c t s t h a t . F u r t h e r , when 
intervention in the credit market seems to be socially desirable it 
hardly constitutes tbe agenda of the government . On the whole, 
the power of representation of the ar t isans being far too weak the 
sector has failed to evoke more active intervention by the state. 
The post-colonial urban-biased development strategy of the state 
has, in fact, consolidated the persistent dual i ty in the domest ic 
economy. In place of the current ly f a sh ionab le case for ' s t a te 
min imal i sm ' , or laissez-faire what is required is a broad view of 
democracy, allowing the possibility of state action guided by motives 
of public interest. 
The role that the non-farm rural small scale manufac tur ing could 
play is perhaps most str ikingly evident in China . She is one of the 
most dynamic economies in the world; her gross domest ic product 
(GDP) increased by 10 per cent per annum in real terms over the 
period 1981-90 (ADB, 1993). The most s ign i f ican t among the 
factors had been the performance of rural enterpr ises which grew 
at the rate of about 34 per cent per annum (at 1980 prices) dur ing 
the period (Islam, 1991). The share of all types of rural economic 
enti t ies in total industrial gross output increased from less than 10 
per cent in 1978, to 18 per cent in 1985, and to about 27 per cent 
in 1990 (Lee, 1994). The reform which began in the agr icul tural 
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scctor, in 1978, shi f ted the focus to rural light industry in the early 
1980s. The latter began to absorb much of the labour force released 
by productivi ty improvements in agr icul ture . Moreover, the even 
higher growth of merchand i se exports (at an annual average rate 
of 14 per cent in real terms) that accompanied China ' s rapid growth 
in the post -1978 period owes much to these rural small enterprises 
which contr ibute ( i tems such as chemicals , machinery, and light 
manufactured goods such as texti les) about one-fif th to the total 
value of expor ts . In br ief , the f i rs t e lement in C h i n a ' s success 
strategy was to create new economic enti t ies domestically, and the 
Chinese relied on them for ma in ta in ing overall economic growth. 
Accumulation of wealth by rura l fami l ies led to the widespread 
emergence of n o n - f a r m indus t r i a l p roduct ion . In the non- fa rm 
private sector, individual enterpr ises consti tuted over 90 per cent 
of an est imated 12.5 mil l ion enterpr ises , in 1991 (ADB, 1993). 
The growth was suppor ted by the foreign trade corporat ions 
(FTCs) who provided these small enterprises the much needed vent-
for-surplus. C h i n a ' s h igh ly central ised control over foreign trade 
began to give way to a more d i f fused regime early in 1978, with 
the FTCs beginning to act independent ly of the centre. The practice 
was official ly sanct ioned and legislat ion soon followed to authorise 
entities other than the twelve nat ional FTCs to engage in trade. 
Central minis t r ies and depar tments , and provincial and municipal 
governments established their own FTCs, some being domestic joint 
ventures involving production uni ts and trading corporations : more 
than 5,000 were in operat ion by the end of the 1980s (Wall and 
F u k a s a k u , 1 9 9 4 ) . In a d d i t i o n to t h e F T C s o w n e d by t h e 
governments , large s ta te-owned enterpr ises , init ially those with 
exports in excess of $ 750,000, were given the r ight to export on 
their own account , as in the case of foreign-funded enterprises. 
Further, these FTCs under the new government policy (known as 
contract responsibility system)4 were to bring the domestic prices 
of exports closer to those obtained on world markets on the other. 
Moreover, the agency system was introduced in the mid-1980s under 
4 FTCs were engaged in contracts that specified targets for foreign exchanse earninss, 
remittances tq the centre of foreign exchange from the FTCs. both provincial and 
national, and the balance of profits and losses from trade activities. 
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which the FTCs would simply act as agents for producers of export 
g o o d s or c o n s u m e r s of i m p o r t s . T h e y w o u l d p a s s on t h e 
international price, in both cases converted via the exchange rate, 
and add on a service charge and any taxes payable. 
If it was the expor t - led growth s t ra tegy tha t p rompted the 
Chinese government to remove all obstacles f rom the growth of 
small scale enterprises , it was the import -subsi t i tu t ion strategy 
geared towards the nat ional employment policy that tr iggered off 
the modernis ing effort in the unorganised manufac tu r ing sector in 
the 1960s, in Taiwan and South Korea , the two private captial 
orientated economies. Both Korea and Taiwan moved to export ing 
l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e m a n u f a c t u r e d p r o d u c t s f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l 
agricultural exports during the first half of the 1960s. The transition 
seems to be inevitable in a developing country with an abundance 
of labour. However, in course, real unskil led wages began to rise 
and surplus labour was gradual ly exhausted, br inging the economy 
to the commercial isa t ion poin t .This threa tened the compet i t ive 
positon in world markets and necessitated technological upgradition 
of the whole economy; the focus sh i f t ed to more t echnology-
intensive products. India has equally elast ic supplies of unskil led 
labour. But such an advantage can apparent ly be converted into a 
real advantage only in the context of a favourable 'total ' enviroment, 
including an industrial entrepreneuria l c lass and the r ight policy 
package to moblize it effectively in a balanced growth context.5 
I l l 
Elec t ronics has been the major growth sector in the world 
economy over the past two decades. Al though the OECD countr ies 
have been the principal benef ic iar ies of that growth a growing 
number of f i r m s f rom the NICs have been ab le to e n t e r as 
technologies and marke ts have r ap id ly evolved (E rns t and O' 
Connor, 1992). There is the debate on whether the late-industrialising 
countr ies should focus their e f fo r t s in the p romot ion of thei r 
electronics capabili t ies. It would not be meaningfu l to enter into 
For a comparative analysis of the historical processes of development in some of 
the Asian countries, see, e.g., Ohkawa and Ranis ( 1 9 8 5 ) . ' 
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the debate here, since that issue cannot be answered in the abstract , 
but must be addressed at the level of sector and country specif ics. 
Nevertheless, a few would maintain that some indigenous design 
capabili t ies are essential for effective use, given the need for close 
interaction between system designers and users (ibid) . Technology 
is obviously a strategic factor at all levels of economic and social 
development. Today technology has become a major ins t rument of 
dominat ion. This applies both to power relations within a society 
(in the context of gender relat ions, see Banerjee, 1993) and to 
internat ional relat ions, especially in the North-South context . In 
the absence of own technological capabilit ies, the prol i ferat ion of 
new technologies into developing countries would lead to new and 
qualitatively intensif ied forms of technological dependence, thus 
further increasing the economic and political hierarcli isation of 
North-South relat ions but also of South-South relat ions,with all 
the implicat ions for underdevelopment, misery and global confl ic t 
potential (Ernst , 1980). 
It is a rgued that the ab i l i ty to cope with newly e m e r g i n g 
technologies will depend in large part on the capabil i t ies revealed 
to cope with industr ial technologies in the past (Lall, 1990). The 
building of industr ial competi t iveness in developing countr ies , as 
Lall (1990) analyses, depends on both firm-level technologica l 
capability (FTC) and nat ional technological capabil i t ies (NTC). 
FTC consists of investment , production and l inkage capabil i t ies 
in addition to entrepreneur ia l and managerial capabili t ies.6 On the 
other hand, NTC depends on the incentives provided to industry, 
the supply of skills available, the efforts undertaken to master, adapt 
and improve upon technologies , and the ins t i tu t ions set up to 
support the funct ioning of markets . However, technological effort 
* Investment capabilities refer to the skills required to identify, prepare, design, set 
up and commission new industrial projects : they determine how efficiently 
investible resources are deployed and how all the firm understands the technologies 
it is utilising. Production capabilities, cover the skills needed to run a plant 
efficiently and to improve it over time, including the financing of R and D. Linkage 
capabilities refer to the skills needed to transfer knowledge and technology between 
enterprises and from enterprises to technology infrastructures : they determine how 
effectively th^ individual firm can specialise and receive support down the larger 
industrial structure and the economy as a whole. 
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is only partially captured by national expendi tures on R and D. On 
the whole, it has been found from the experience of the NICs that 
FTC and NTC depend on each other and that great capabili ty in 
one without the other is not effective (Bradford, 1993). 
In the neoclassical trade theory, ' technology' is treated to be 
freely available to all countr ies and, within countries, to all f irms. 
Countr ies s imply settle on appropr ia te levels of capi ta l / labour 
intensity in accordance with their factor price ratios, determined 
by their relative endowments of physical capital and labour. Firms 
in a given industry are all on the same production funct ion and 
select their technologies according to relative factor prices, shif t ing 
costlessly along the funct ion as the ratio changes . To the extent 
that technology lags are admit ted, developing countr ies are taken 
to receive all r e levan t i m p r o v e m e n t s f rom deve loped count ry 
innovators : there is no problem in ass imila t ing the t ransferred 
technology. Even the appropriate technology literature assumes that 
efficiency would reign in all f i rms if only the relevant techniques 
were 'discovered' and factor price dis tor t ions removed. Th is sort 
of assumption induces the t ransfer of technology l i terature to focus 
a t t en t ion on the t e rms of the t r a n s f e r a n d i m p e r f e c t i o n s in 
international technology markets, rather than on the efficiency with 
which the technology is used by the impor ter . The t radi t ional 
approaches fail to explain why the same technology is applied with 
widely ranging productivi t ies in di f ferent countries, and also by 
d i f fe ren t f i rms in the same country , developed or deve loping 
(Nelson, 1981). 
The Korean electronics industry is widely acknowledged to be 
one of the most succes s fu l e x a m p l e s of i ndus t r i a l l a t ecomer 
strategies. The early phase of the industry 's development was almost 
exclusively domestic. Assembly of AM radios for the domest ic 
market started in 1958 in smal l -scale operat ions . The industry 
began to change noticeably in the mid - 1960s. During the past 
twenty five years, the Korean electronics industry has developed 
extremely rapidly. Throughout the history of the Korean electronics 
industry, exports have been its focal point (Bloom, 1992). However, 
this is not to overemphasise the debate about trade policies for 
industrialisation, rather to get out of the false di lemma and examine 
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the h o m e marke t ques t ion in i ts w i d e r con tex t . The re la t ive 
impor tance of the internal market and of external markets in the 
process of industr ia l isat ion is crucial ly determined by the size of 
the economy, in terms of the real per capita income.7 Since many 
industr ial technologies arc character ized by increasing returns to 
scale, only a suf f ic ien t ly large domes t ic market will al low for 
efficient growth. However, Korean market remained much too small 
for cost-effect ive production of many electronic products. As a 
result , for the major export i tems, exports represented at least 75 
per cent of production until recently (Ernst and O 'Connor 1992; 
Bloom, 1992). 
Access to overseas markets is almost as important as access to 
technology for the late industr ial isers. Korean companies were thus 
heavily dependent on original equ ipment manufac turer (OEM)8 
export agreements with foreign companies . The latter enabled the 
Korean industry to (a) overcome the l imitat ions of domestic market, 
and (b) obtain technology. In many OEM deals, the buyer specifies 
design and advises on machinery and equipment . Especially where 
the agreement is tied to a joint venture, the buyer will often train 
the employees of the Korean company to use and maintain the 
equipment , as well as in other relevant skills, and will provide its 
own eng inee r s to act as t roubleshooters . Dur ing the course of 
d e v e l o p m e n t in Korea , the per cap i t a real income increased 
s igni f icant ly resul t ing in expanded effective demand. And she is 
now in a position to depend on the domest ic market , in case of 
export barriers, for a steady growth rate. The abilities of the Korean 
companies themselves to acquire and absorb technology, to produce 
a n d to d e v e l o p n e w p r o d u c t s , a n d to a d j u s t to c h a n g i n g 
ci rcumstances , is partly a reflection of the level of development of 
Korea ' s research infras t ructure , as well as of the nature of their 
corporate organisat ion. 
7 The proportion of disposable income available for industrial goods apart from basic 
necessities (of course, it changes alongwith economic transformation), is crucial. 
8 OEM or Original Equipment Manufacture occurs when a company arranges for an 
item to be produced with its logo or brand name on it, even though the company is 
not the producer. It is a type of subcontracting relationship. It is especially prominent 
in the consumer electronics industry where retailers like to promote their image or 
manufacturers want to extent their product range. It is equivalent to own brand 
merchandise in food retailing. 
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The electronics industry in India was nucleated during the early 
1960s with the manufacture of radio receivers by a few private firms. 
That the Government of India was aware of the prospect of the 
electronics industry and keen on developing the domestic base of 
the industry are evident f rom the fact that it constituted the Bhabha 
Commission as early as in the mid-1960s whose main concerns 
were to locate areas of compet i t ive advantage, and suggest future 
plans. The government set up a separate Department of Electronics 
(DOE) in 1970 and in February 1971, the Electronics Commission 
was consti tuted. The Bhabha Commit tee estimated that the annual 
electronics output would reach to a level of Rs. 480 crores (at 1966 
prices) in a ten year period. However, only 50 per cent of the target 
was f u l f i l l e d by 1975. T h e l i m i t e d p r o g r e s s p r o m p t e d the 
g o v e r n m e n t to set up a n o t h e r c o m m i t t e e in 1979 ( S o n d h i 
Committee) in order to review and suggest new directions of policy, 
and organisat ional s t ructures in the DOE. Further, a commit tee 
under the cha i rmanship of M.G.K. Menon was formed in 1978 to 
examine the existing product ion capacity for exportable electronic 
products in terms of qual i ty/quant i t ies , identify technology gaps 
that existed and suggest remedia l measures to e l iminate these, 
suggest measures to augment the exist ing capacity, recommend the 
role of export houses, suggest f iscal incent ives , and any other 
recommendation to ensure a major export thrust in electronics with 
particular emphasis on diversification of products and destinations. 
The government accepted most of the major recommendat ions 
of both the Sondhi Commit tee and Menon Committee. By the early 
1980s, the electronics industry was relatively free from many of 
the regulatory mechanisms/ ins t i tu t iona l constraints which have 
been held responsible, by many, as the major obstacles to private 
investment-led expansion during the pre-reform period, and enjoyed 
a great deal of export incentives. Foreign collaborat ions were quite 
liberally approved. The import of fully assembled and ready-to-use 
electronic equipment, excluding test equipment , like in Korea, was 
restricted. Capital goods not available endogenously were placed 
on OGL. Substantial reduction in import duties on certain electronic 
raw mate r ia l s was a l lowed. And, a bunch of other f iscal and 
financial relaxations were allowed to the industry by the beginning 
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of the 1980s. Allowing more and more concessions to the industry 
was a dist inct trend in the eighties. Although the Sondhi Committee 
recommended to raise the investment l imit for delicensing from 
Rs. 30 mill ion to Rs. 100 mill ion the government turned down the 
recommendat ion on the ground that 95 per cent of the industrial 
licence applications involved investment of less than Rs. 30 million. 
The latter perhaps amply reveals that the electronics industry in 
India, unl ike in other Asian la te- industr ia l is ing countr ies , had 
failed to attract domestic big capital in the 1970s.. The emphasis 
on the public sector-led growth during the period may partly explain 
the phenomenon but one has to look beyond that and examine the 
question of technological capabili t ies at the f irm-level . 
On the whole, if the period upto 1980 is marked by government 
intervention the following years definitely showed distinct trend 
towards market orientation. Going by the value of outputs at current 
prices, the growth rate dur ing the 1980s was considerably higher 
than that in the 1970s; al though the tempo tapered off since 1987. 
The higher values of output during the 1980s was largely accounted 
for the quick profi t-yielding consumer electronics sub-sector with 
considerable pent-up demand, and also higher production costs in 
most of the sub-sectors. Interestingly while in the seventies all the 
major sub-sectors (viz., consumer, professional and components) 
had grown more or less in a balanced manner the higher growth of 
outputs in the eighties was at the cost of that inter-sectoral balance : 
the growth in the consumer electronics was far ahead of both 
p r o f e s s i o n a l and c o m p o n e n t s sectors (see DOE, Electronics 
Information & Planning, various issues). The different branches of 
electronics production are highly interdependent , performance-
wise. And there is high probability that the disproportional growth 
in any part icular line of production, in the absence of a strong 
domestic base of R and D, ultimately ends up with an adverse trade 
ba lance in al l the b ranches of p rodc t ion . Joseph (1995) has 
estimated the import content in electronics production in India 
during 1981-89. The trend clearly indicates increas ing import 
dependence which really began with the introduction of colour TV 
in 1982 and its subsequent growth (Report of the Working Group 
on Electronics Industry for Eighth Five Year Plan. chp. 1). As such. 
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import dcpcndcncc means outflow of foreign exchange. But it has 
greater implicat ions. 
In the early years of Korea ' s electronics industry, emphas i s was 
placed on products assembled from imported parts rind components , 
especially products for exports. In 1968, almost 92 per cent of all 
the raw materials and components needed by the Korean electronics 
industry were imported from Japan and the United States (Bloom, 
1992). This dependency on imported components was of concern 
to the Korean government . As a result, the key part of an eight-
year plan for the industry introduced in 1969, was devoted to a 
planned increase in domest ic parts production. The a im was to 
increase localisation level to 95 per cent in consumer electronics , 
85 per cent in industr ial electronics and 80 per cent in componen ts 
and mater ia ls . However, by 1987, the level had only achieved 40 
per cent for the industry as a whole (ibid). The reason for this 
failure, and for the continuing dependence on imported components 
is completely different f rom that of the case in India. In Korea , the 
dependence accounted for changes in the product range conforming 
to the changes in export markets . As products have been superseded 
by more advanced types, domestic parts production appeared to be 
inadequte for the new products, and the process has to start all 
over again. In fact, not only Korea, in some of the other far eastern 
Asian countries namely, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Tha i l and 
and Philippines, where significant growth of the electronics industry 
took place during the 1980s, electronics imports as percen tage of 
domestic electronics production remained signif icantly h igher than 
that in India. Yet, because of their abil i ty to expor t , a l l these 
countries had been able to yield substantial posit ive trade balance 
while India consistently imported much greater amounts than her 
exports, by value, in all the branches of product ion, viz. , off ice 
a u t o m a t i o n e q u i p m e n t , i n d u s t r i a l con t ro l s , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s 
equipment, consumer electronics, and electronic components (Ernst 
and O ' C o n n o r , 1992, as c i ted f rom the Yearbook of World 
Electronics Data 1988 and 1990, Oxford, 1990). 
These much smaller far eastern Asian countr ies , par t icular ly 
K o r e a , T a i w a n , S i n g a p o r e , Hong K o n g , a n d M a l a y s i a f a r 
outstripped India in values of electronics product ion. In 1988, for 
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instance, the value of e lectronics production in Korea was SIX.944 
mill ion, in Taiwan $13,764m., S ingapore $10,653m., Hong Kong 
$6,929m., Malaysia $4 ,401m. while that in India was $4,038m.; 
of the latter more than 40 per cent constituted consumer electronics. 
Moreover, of the total Indian consumer electronics production, i.e., 
$ l , 6 3 7 m . only $19m. were expoprted, in 1988 (ibid). The overall 
trend du r ing the fo l lowing years r emained almost unchanged ; 
perhaps the only exception being s ignif icant growth in production 
of national communication equipment in, and software export (about 
40 per cent of the national aggregate electronics exports) from 
India9 (Electronics Information & Planning, various issues; DOE, 
Chopra , et.al., 1994). What is being emphasised here is that these 
successful countr ies have been able to overcome the l imitat ions 
imposed on the growth of the sector by the ini t ial size of the 
domest ic market by simply in ternal iz ing the external market . This 
has been possible because of the abilities of the domestic companies, 
in these far eastern countries, to acquire and absorb new technology, 
to produce and to develop new products and to adjust to rapidly 
changing c i rcumstances in the in te rna t iona l markets . Data for 
Korean electronics production in the late 1980s, for instance, show 
that about 65 per cent of the aggregate production were shared by 
the domes t i c c o m p a n i e s whi le the sha re of the j o i n t - v e n t u r e 
companies was 24 per cent and that of the foreign companies was 
l imited to 11 per cent only. Fur ther , about 91 per cent of the 
consumer electronics production was under the control of domestic 
companies (Bloom, 1992, as compiled from data provided by the 
' Indian software export, however, is basically what has been calied a 'body shopping' 
or 'professional services' where the Indian professionals are-contracted to overseas 
concerns on time and management basis. The government approved imported 
hardware, in other words the installation of computer by the software units have 
been normally used for training the professional on these computers and using them 
for domestic data processing activities. The 'body shopping' activity has been 
contributing up to 80 per cent of the total software exports from India. In other 
words, much of India's export work developing custom software is actually carried 
out at the clients's site overseas ( 'onsite') rather than offshore in India. In general 
terms. India's software export trade has been characterised by an international skill 
division of labour such that the majority of software contracts allocate only the 
less-skilled coding and testing stages to Indian workers. That is to say, Indian 
workers have far more often been used as programmers rather than as systems 
analyst or designers (DOE, Oberoi and Raghunathan, 1991: Heeks. 1992). 
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Electronics Industry Association of Korea). On the other hand, 
the low FTC in India is perhaps most revealing in/ the computer 
industry, and which remain hidden behind the phenomenal increase 
in turnover; the turnover in hardware had incresed from Rs. 9,250 
million in 1989-90 to Rs. 17,600 million in 1993-94. Almost all of 
the major components and units are imported1 0 : 
Imported Indigenous 
Central Processing Units Cabinets 
Multilayered PCBs Keyboards 
Disk drives Power supply units 
RAM chips Floppy diskettes 
Colour monitors Black and white monitors 
Mouse Cables 
Electronics industry accounted for between five and six per cent 
of the total foreign collaborations in India which had been approved 
between 1957 and 1977 (Gulati and Bansal, 1980). This proportion 
has been increasing over the years. In the 1960s and 1970s the 
average number of foreign collaborations in electronics industry 
annually was 16 while the scenario drastically changed in the 1980s. 
Altogether 1,132 foreign collaborations were made by Indian firms 
dur ing 1981-90 (Table 1), the bulk of which are c lass i f i ed as 
' t echnologica l ' . It is also noteworthy that industrial e lectronics , 
and electronic components constituted about 64 per cent of the total 
number of collaborations. 
For r e a s o n s such as acces s to u p t o d a t e t e c h n o l o g y , cos t 
e f fec t iveness given the limited domest ic market , and improved 
export earnings to f inance the essential e lec t ronic imports , the 
government, in the early 1970s, imposed export obligtions in the 
case of foreign collaboration in the sector. To the extent the export 
obligation imposed on the domestic firm is shared by its foreign 
collaborator by assuming responsibility to buy back a portion of 
the domest ic f i rm ' s ou tpu t , the fore ign co l l abo ra t i on too will 
develop a stake in cost-effective production by its partner f irm. In 
10 In this context, the impact of the massive reductions in import duties on major 
computer importable*, over the last three years and particularly in 1995-96, seems 
to be far-fetched. 
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most of the cases the obligation to export was within the narrower 
range of 40 per cent to 60 per cent of annual output. However, the 
policy of imposing export obligation on foreign collaboration never 
yielded the desired results (Gulati and Bansal, 1980). The report 
prepared by the Association of Indian Engineering Industries (AIEI) 
(1984) perhaps bears testimony to the fact that Indian big capital 
was opposed to the policy of export obligations. The report states : 
'Growth e x p e r i e n c e in the Far East makes us o f t en b e l i e v e 
in a rather d is torted p o l i c y p r e s c r i p t i o n - e x p o r t — l e d growth 
in e l e c t r o n i c s . Al l th ings c o n s i d e r e d , this is not p o s s i b l e 
in India t i l l 1 9 9 0 (or e v e n later) - the e x i s t e n c e o f S E E P Z 
and the s e t t i n g up n e w E E P Z s wi l l not alter this picture in 
any great way.' 
While the slow growth in per capita real income restricted the 
expansion of domestic market it is perhaps the weakness of Indian 
private capital that compelled them to hinge on the internal market. 
Electronic exportable should embody the latest in technology which 
incidentally the Indian products were not. 
Table 1 
Foreign collaboration in Indian electronics industry, 1971-93 
Sector 1971 JJQ 1981-85 1986-90 
1991-93 
Pub. Pri. Pub. Pri. Pub. Pri. Pub. Pri. 
1. Control instrumen-
tations and Indus-
trial electronics 7 21 22 104 27 249 
7 145 
2. Electronic compo-
ments and materials 17 21 19 96 20 185 6 107 
3. Communication and 
Broadcast equipment 10 7 44 22 63 91 20 73 
- 32 
4. Consumer electronics - 2 - 11 
I 21 
5. Data processing 
systems 1 3 4 33 8 112 
2 57 
TOTAL 35 54 89 266 119 658 35 414 
Source : DOE. 1993. * 
Notes : The actual number of collaborations seems to be greater than tabulated above 
since a number of companies later ceased operation while the above figures, 
in the Source, are based on the units still in operation (cf. Joseph. 1995). 
Pub = Public sector units; Pri = Private enterprises 
27 
Ill placc of the problem of low growth of FTC, one may argue 
that the constraint on export expansion originated in the incentives 
of fered by the home marke t ; lower p ro f i t ab i l i ty of expor t s as 
compared to domest ic sales. It may so happen that all the export 
incentives put together still fell far short of the effective protection 
for import substitution. However, in the light of the recommendation 
of the Sondhi Commit tee (1979), which the government took note 
o f : ' the industry should be put on notice that tariff protection would 
be gradual ly reduced so that they might take steps to reduce their 
cost of production and build up their competitive strength in definite 
time f r ame ' , and the fact that since the mid-1980s there has been 
def in i te threat of l iberalization looming large over the sector, it is 
d i f f icul t to accept such a proposition unless one is very sceptical of 
the long term behaviour whatsoever of Indian pr iva te capi ta l . 
Moreover, if protection is isolated as the key factor then one has to 
explain the growth in Korea and Taiwan which are known for high 
trade protection regimes, at least up to the end of the 1980s. Public 
planning for industrialisation is found to be a common phenomenon 
in most of the late-industrialising countries. However, it is die state 
action to discipl ining private capital and the specific response of 
the latter to var ious public policies that d is t inguish , to a great 
extent , the countr ies from each other. Public intervention in the 
form of subsidies and rewards has been aimed at distort ing relative 
prices in pursuance of broader social objectives. This has been as 
true in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan as in India and many other 
late-industrial ising countries. However, in, say, Korea the state used/ 
to i m p o s e p e r f o r m a n c e s t a n d a r d s on the s u b s i d y / i n c e n t i v e s 
receiving private f irms. This kind of a pr inciple of reciprocity is 
h a r d l y e v i d e n t in Ind ia and so, a m o n g o the r f a c t o r s , is the 
d is t inguishing behaviour of private industr ial capital . 
Any at tempt to hold the government policies responsible for the 
fa i lure of bui lding up technological capabi l i t ies in the country 
should also take into account the cases of success of a few public 
sector units. In 1984, for instance, the government established the 
Cen t re for the Development of Telemat ics (C-DoT) to design, 
develop and commercial ise digital e lectronic switching systems 
(ESS). Until then practically all equipment were either imported 
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or p r o d u c e d domes t i ca l ly with impor ted knowhow. Since the 
l aunch ing of the C-DoT programme the government froze new 
collaborat ion agreements in the area, and blocked the expansion 
in local production of Alcatel-Cit 's E-10B main automatic exchange 
(MAX). By 1992 the C-DoT had successfully commercial ised its 
family of ESS like the RAX, EPABX, and MAX (up to a capacity 
of 10,000 lines), and a total of over two mill ion telephone lines are 
now connected to C-DoT exchanges, which is close to the global 
f ront ie rs in terms of size (Chandra , 1994). A large part of the 
success was due to the role of the government in protecting the 
nascent organisat ion against unequal competit ion from the TNCs. 
f On the whole, the case of electronics is only indicative of the 
gene ra l t rend in Indian indus t r ies : the technologica l e f fo r t s 
associated with the imports have focussed mainly on adapting the 
imports and that involved almost all of the R and D expendi tures 
incurred : the building-up of in-house technological capabil i t ies is 
rarely evident . The situation is not peculiar to electronics industry 
(see, e.g., Katrak, 1994, for the empirical results on the technology-
intensive chemical and allied industries). It is in this perspective 
that L a l l ' s (1990) hypothes is , based on the exper ience of ten 
developing countr ies in Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, that the ability to cope with newly emerging technologies 
will depend in large part on the capabili t ies revealed to cope with 
industr ia l technologies in the past, seems to be relevant in the 
context of recent thrust to indust r ia l deve lopment , over t ly or 
covertly with foreign capital, in India, in general , and in West 
Bengal, in part icular . Foreign capital may act as the substitute of 
domestic surplus (generated in a process which involves all aspects 
of an e c o n o m y ) . But one cannot e n s u r e that tha t would not 
jeopardise the sovereignty of the nation-state, part icularly when 
the lessons of some of the Latin American countries bear testimony 
towards that end. Despite early beginning, more liberal approvals 
of foreign collaboration, a good deal of incentives, and having a 
wide network of inst i tutional infrastructure, private investments 
in the e lectronics industry in India maintained a low profile. The 
total cumula t ive investments in electronics in India up to 1991 is 
est imated to be about Rs. 5,000 crore, of which a little over Rs. 
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2,000 crorc were invested during the Seventh Plan period (1985-
90). In contrast , an est imate shows that over Rs. 7 ,200 crore were 
invested in the sector in Malaysia in just five years during 1987-91 
(DOE, Chopra, et.al., 1994). Further, out of the total gross fixed 
capital formation of about Rs. 135,260 crore in 1991-92, electronics 
could attract only about 0.37 per cent (about Rs. 500 crore) (ibid). 
Such low inves tments only encouraged large imports , and thus 
substantially eroded the long term competitive position of the Indian 
e lec t ron ics indus t ry . Thus , there is ha rd ly any r ea sons to be 
optimistic about the future prospects of the industry as well as other 
technology intensive industries if the current trend of public policies 
towards ass igning major role to Indian big private capital cont inue. 
IV 
Within this general fVamework of success and fai lure let us look 
into the relative per formance of the electronics industry in West 
Benga l . S ince 1971, the E l ec t ron i c s C o m m i s s i o n h a v e been 
encouraging all the state governments to set up state e lectronics 
development corporat ion (SEDC) with a view to (a) develop their 
own production units, and (b) promote private investments in the 
sector by providing them with necessary R and D, and marke t ing 
infrs t ructure . The first SEDC was set up in Kerala (Kel t ron) in 
1972, and subsequently followed by West Bengal (Webel), Uttar 
Pradesh (Uptron), Maharasht ra (Meltron), and other states. Before 
the SEDCs were set up, the industry was located mainly around 
Bangalore, Bombay/Pune, and Delhi. Bangalore was the site of 
m a j o r p u b l i c s e c t o r c o r p o r a t i o n s in d e f e n c e a n d 
t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . Bombay and Pune were the t r a d i t i o n a l 
locations of pr ivate sector, largely foreign-owned f i rms . The Delhi 
region became important in the sixties with the emergence of a 
dynamic SSI sector making radios, components for radios, and later 
black and white TV. 
The latest data available (i.e., for the year 1993) show that about 
58 per cent of the production is accounted for by the three states, 
v iz . , K a r n a t a k a , M a h a r a s h t r a and Ut t a r P r a d e s h . H o w e v e r , 
Karnataka and Maharash t ra had over 75 per cent share in 1971. 
The growth in Uttar Pradesh though to a large extent owes to the 
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eight central public sector plants, the role of privte investments in 
the NOIDA free trade zone is quite s ignif icant . On the other hand, 
as is evident in Table 2A, West Bengal has been steadily losing its 
relat ive posi t ion, in terms of electronics product ion, since, say, 
1971. Tha t there is only one (till 1992, two units) central public 
sector p lant in the state, may provide an explanat ion . But then one 
has to explain the factors behind the s ignif icant growth in, say, 
Kerala, Pun jab (having only one central public sector plant each), 
or Gujara t , Delhi (having no such units) (see, Table 2B). 
In fact , to reduce regional disparity, the SEDCs were supposed 
to act as the nodal agencies. So far as the number of electronics 
producing units is concerned, in almost all the states, bulk of the 
units belong to small scale category (Table 2B). And that demands 
much more support ive role of the SEDC. That the SSI units have 
been able to enter into technology as well as capital intensive areas 
of production is evident from the fact that the high-growth states 
arc those where product-mix is oriented more towards such areas 
as c o n t r o l i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l e l e c t r o n i c s , da ta 
p rocess ing sys tems, communica t ion and broadcas t equ ipment , 
s t r a t eg i c e l e c t r o n i c s , and componen t s , r a the r than consumer 
e l c t r o n i c s . A m o n g the top f ive s ta tes in all these sec tors of 
p r o d u c t i o n , Wes t B e n g a l a p p e a r e d on ly o n c e in c o n s u m e r 
electronics in 1981, as third in the rank. In 1993, she has even lost 
that posi t ion, al though consumer electronics consti tuted about 65 
per cent of her domestic production (DOE, Rastogi, et.al., 1994). 
Given the high level of participation of SSI units in electronics 
production in almost all of the states, the relative decline of the 
i ndus t ry in West Bengal a l so a s sumes s i g n i f i c a n c e f rom the 
perspect ive of agr icu l tu re - indus t ry re la t ionsh ip . Pun jab whose 
agricul tural growth had been substantial, during the period, also 
improved her posit ion in electronics production f rom 13th in 1981 
to 7th, among die states, in 1993. On the other hand, the agricultural 
growth notwithstanding which seems to be significant, West Bengal 
experienced a set back in electronics. While it is largely the small 
and medium capital that induced growth in Punjab one wonders 
why West Bengal failed on that account. 
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That the S E D C in m a n y s ta les have been i n s t r u m e n t a l in 
p run .o t .ng the indus t ry is pe rhaps most s t r o n g l y e v i d e n t in 
Kerala, w h h o t h e r w i s e i g a n i n d a s l r i a l l y b a c k w a r d ^ M 
of the subsidiary units of Keltron are engaged in the production of 
component electronics. And Keltron has act ively promoted small 
producers cooperatives (part icularly women ' s cooperat ives) in the 
distr icts to get components , either own-produced or procured from 
the market , assembled by them. Keltron started producing radio-
sets ,n its own factory, in 1976. Later, in 1980, it decided to shift 
from low technology-based products to more technology-intensive 
areas. In collaboration with the State Social Welfare Board, Keltron 
then i m p l e m e n t e d the s c h e m e to s u p p l y t h e m a t e r i a l s and 
components to the cooperatives and get the radio-sets assembled 
u, ^ J h C S C h e m e W a S l a t e r e x t e n d e d to TV, voltage stabil izer , 
public address system, etc. Electronic calculator is another instance 
where Keltron was proved to be successful in promoting small scale 
uni ts . In the late 1970s, Keltron under took the produc t ion of 
c a l c u l a t o r s in i ts own fac tory . C a l c u l a t o r m a r k e t is h i g h l y 
competi t ive, and Keltron products with their h igh overhead costs 
lailed to be competitive. Keltron then decided to discontinue with its production 
and market the prodcts of the SSI units under its brand name 
Table 2A 
Statewlse Production of Electronics, 1971-1992 
State 1971 1931 
1993 
Share in Rank Share in Rank Share in 
aggregate aggregate aggregate 
production production production 
w («) (%) 
w (2) O) (4) (5) 
Rank 
Andhra Pradesh 5.4 3 7.3 
D e , h i 2.9 7 14.6 
(6) (7) 
5 4.6 6 
3 9.4 4 
— ~ ~ contd. 
Keltron and Lptron together accounted for about 20 per cent of the total public 
sector production (Electronics Information and Planning, November 1991). 
Though it requires a thorough investigation as to why some of the Keltron 
subsidiaries have recently gone sick, the success and failure of Keltron must be 
judged in the light of the overall situation in the country. Secondly, one cannot 
underestimate the role played so far by Keltron in promoting the industry in such 
an industrially backward state. 
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contd Table 2A 
Slate 
(1) 
Gujarat 
Kandla (FTZ) 
Production 
(Rs. Crore) 
Haryana 
Kamataka 
Kerala 
Cochin (FTZ) 
Production 
(Rs. Crore) 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
SEEPZ (FTZ) 
Production 
(Rs. Crore) 
Punjab 
Rajas than 
Tamil Nadu 
Madras (FTZ) 
Production 
(Rs. Crore) 
Uttar Pradesh 
Noida (FTZ): 
Production 
(Rs. Crore) 
West Bengal 
Falta (FTZ) : 
Production 
(Rs. Crore) 
1971 1981 
Share in 
aggregate 
production 
(%) 
(2) 
0.4 
Rank 
(3) 
11 
1993 
Share in 
aggregate 
production 
(%) 
(4) 
3.5 
Rank 
(5) 
8 
Share in 
aggregate 
production 
<%) 
(6) 
3.8 
Rank 
(7) 
(-) - (-) - (0.2) _ 
4.7 5 1.8 12 1.2 13 
56.5 1 20.7 2 20.7 1 
0.6 10 2.5 10 3.7 9 
(-) — 
. ( " ) (13.5) 
1.1 9 1.8 11 1.7 12 
16.7 2 23.8 1 17.3 3 
(-) - (25.5) _ (481.5) 
— - 0.7 13 4.0 7 
5.0 4 2.6 9 3.0 11 
2.6 8 4.1 7 6.5 5 
(-) — (-) _ (58.5) 
0.3 12 11.0 4 19.6 2 
(-) — (-) . (78.1) 
3.7 6 5.0 6 3.3 10 
(-) - (-) - (0.17) -
Sources 
Notes 
C o l s . ( 2 ) and (3) , Datta Chaudhur i ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; Co l s . ( 4 ) - ( 7 ) , 
Electronics Information & Planning ( D e c e m b e r 1994) . 
1) P r o d u c t i o n o f FTZ is no t i n c l u d e d in c a l c u l a t i n g the 
percentage share of d i f ferent states. 
2 ) For the c a l c u l a t i o n of the s h a r e ' o f d i f f e r e n t s ta te s in 
p r o d u c t i o n , p h y s i c a l l oca t ion of the plant (and not the 
reg is tered o f f i c e ) is cons idered . 
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liable 2B 
Stalcwise Production of Electronics, 1993 
State/Union No. of units Industrial Central State Major 
Territory Total SSI Employment license PSU PSU Production 
approved plant* plants centres • 
(No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Andhra Pradesh 141 106 27.000 113 5 2 Hyderabad, Viskha-
patam. Patancheru, 
Medak. 
Delhi 317 285 40.000 45 - - Delhi. 
Gujarat 193 153 14,000 110 - 2 Gandhinagar, Vado-
dara, Naroda, Ahm-
edabad 
Haryana 68 45 6,150 69 1 1 Faridabad, Panchk-
uba, Mohindergarh, 
Gurgaon. 
Kama la ka 288 225 48,000 208 5 4 Bangalore, Mysore, 
Doddaballapur, 
Tumkur. 
Kerala 74 48 10,000 79 1 11 Palghat, Trivandrum, 
Cannanore. Mulant-
hurthy. 
Madhya Pradesh 42 25 7,000 20 2 1 Bhopal, Jabalpur, 
Raisen, Indore, 
Richhai, Bhilai. 
Maharashtra 716 616 60,000 252 1 6 Bombay, Pune, Thane, 
Ahmednagar, Nasik. 
Punjab 47 31 7,800 46 1 8 Mohali, Ludhiana. 
Rajas than 80 57 10,000 41 1 2 Kota, Bhrwadi, 
Udaipur. Jaipur. 
Tamilnadu 269 210 16,700 .92 2 2 Madra, Hosur, 
Coimbatore, 
Chencalpati. 
Uttar Pradesh 179 105 41,500 117 8 10 Ghaziabad, Manka-
pur. Noida, Naini, 
Lucknow, Rae 
Bareili, Kashipur, 
Rampur, Kotdwra, 
and 5 others. 
West Bengal 152 119 13,500 52 1 10 Calcutta. 
All India 2,064 2,081 310.000 1.334 29 71 
Falta (FTZ) 2 — 50 
Cochin (") 5 — 70 
S E E P Z O 97 — 1,220 
Madras (") 13 — 50 
Noida (") 21 - - 150 
Source : Electronics Information & Planning. December 1994. 
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There are many reasons why Webel/WBEIDC failed to promote 
the industry in the state. First, most of the Webel units are found to 
have making huge losses. It pr imari ly concentrated on capital 
in tens ive components and professional e lec t ronics sectors the 
products of which, unless are exported to other states or to abroad, 
seem to be profitable only when state domestic electronics sector 
are able to create adequate demand. It is true that pr ivate big 
investments in electronics in West Bengal fell far behind many other 
states. Yet, Webel failed to capitalize on the limited market because 
of organisa t ional inefficiency, poor quality or higher prices of 
products, and faulty production planning (Datta Chaudhury, 1995). 
Small TV manufacturers in West Bengal, for instance, prefer to 
purchase capacitors from ELCOT (Electronics Corporation of Tamil 
Nadu) rather than from Webel due to price difference (ibid). Further, 
Webel Telematics Ltd., was formed with a view to produce electronic 
te lepr in te rs as its major product. After long delays when the 
company actually started commercial production, Fax machines had 
already dominated the market. All these resulted into poor financial 
performance1 2 which, in turn hindered the expansion of the Webel 
units or product diversification. 
To c o n c l u d e , the f r e i g h t e q u a l i s a t i o n s c h e m e a n d the 
discriminatory action in approving industrial licenses by the central 
government have always been the chief arguments, by many, for 
industrial decline in West Bengal. However, the freight equalisation 
scheme p e r h a p s had least impact on the g rowth p a t t e r n in 
electronics industry. The distribution of industrial licenses also 
cannot be the major factor to explain regional disparit ies in growth. 
First, one has to show that there was effective demand for industrial 
licenses from the state. Secondly, India's electronics industry is 
largely based on small-scale units. The Government of West Bengal, 
it seems, relied heavily on fiscal incentives in order to attract large 
scale investments in the sector while all the states mainta ined 
IJ Most of the Webel units such as Webel Crystals, Webel Electronics Communication 
Systems, Webel Power Electronics, Webel Business Machines, Webel Video Devices 
have been showing negative net worth for about last 10 years. Their existence and 
operation to a great extent now depends on the crores of rupees as loans from the 
Government of West Bengal (Renu Kalckar, The Telegraph, 31 January 1995). 
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almost similar incentive schemes. The general industr ial c l imate 
in d i f fe ren t s tates whi le provided the c r u c i a l ' e x t c r n a l i t i e s ' to 
investments in electronics the promotional projects of respect ive 
SEDCs, which include R and D and facil i t ies centres, computer 
cent res , manpower development and t r a in ing centres , nuc leus 
projects, ins t ruments servicing and repair centres, and marke t ing 
the products of small scale units, etc., have been ins t rumenta l in 
the unevenness of growth across the s tates . One ins tance may 
h i g h l i g h t the g e n e r a l l a c u n a e in the s t a t e ' s d e v e l o p m e n t a l 
programme. Instrumentation Ltd., a central public sector enterprise, 
continuously insisted on having a course on instrumentat ion in the 
s ta te 's technical inst i tutes, and they even promised to share some 
of the f inancial l iabil i t ies. But till recently, none of the technical 
inst i tutes came forward to oblige. 
On the whole, as it appears, there may have a few more foreign 
collaborations, in future , but unless the technological capabi l i t ies 
of the nodal agency (Webel) are improved it would be dif f icul t for 
the state to achieve a sustained growth. Up to 1993, the Webel units/ 
W B E I D C e n t e r e d i n t o 20 f o r e i g n c o l l a b o r a t i o n s , m o s t l y 
t echno log ica l (Source : DOE, i temwise fore ign co l l abo ra t i on 
approved in electronics) but that did not lead to any discernible 
degree of R and D support for the industry in the state, par t icular ly 
small scale units, nei ther the competitive advantage of Webel over 
other SEDCs. And, this perhaps would expla in the very poor 
pe r fo rmance of the Falta FTZ as compared to Cochin, SEEPZ, 
M a d r a s and Noida F T Z s . F ina l ly , wha t m a k e s West B e n g a l 
^electronics industry s ignif icantly different from others in another 
account is the spatial concentrat ion. As it is evident in Table 2B, 
all the states other than West Bengal have a number of major growth 
C e n t r e s . T h e e n t i r e i n d u s t r y in West B e n g a l , h o w e v e r , is 
concentra ted in and around Calcut ta a l though it is a foot loose 
industry and dominated by SSI units. The pattern of urbanizat ion 
in the state coupled with the ineffect iveness of WBEIDC/Webel 
beyond the boundaries of the capital-city perhaps would explain 
the phenomenon a little further . 
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V 
One aspect of industrial isat ion i.e., human development often 
remain neglected in policy formulat ion. Many a time it is assumed 
that industr ia l development itself would attend to human capital 
formation and human resource development. However, historical 
exper ience does not allow us to take on to such a sequencing of 
growth strategy. Human capital refers to the productive capacit ies 
of human being as income producing agents in the economy, and it 
is, by def in i t ion , the stock (like non-human capital) of skil ls and 
product ive knowledge embodied in people (see, e.g., Schultz 1961-
Becker, 1964). However, the UNDP, Human Development Report 
captures human development as something more than the concept 
of human capital formation entails. Human development brings 
together the production and distribution of commodit ies and the 
expansion and use of human capabiliteis (for a detailed discussion, 
see Human Development Report 1990 : chp. 1; Dasgupta, 1993). 
Three e lements of human life, such as life expectancy at birth 
knowledge, and decent living standards have been focused as the 
key issues of human development (ibid). So far as 'knowledge ' is 
concerned, l i teracy f igures are only a crude reflection of access to 
educat ion, par t icular ly to the good quality education. The third key 
element , i.e., a decent living, however, is related to such things as 
access to land, credit , income and other resources as well as to 
market . 
By the human development index, India belongs to the ' low 
development ' category. The successful NICs in east and south-east 
Asia, on the other hand, also maintains a pretty high level of human 
development . It would perhaps help us to understand the causali ty 
if we look back to the situation in these countries in the early 1960s 
at the t ime when most of them took to greater efforts towards 
industrialisation through essentially land reforms. In sum, they were 
in a f a r bet ter pos i t ion than India was, so far as the var ious 
indica tors of human development are concerned (see Table 3) 
However, the causality needs to be careful ly interpreted : human 
development can at best be the necessary condition of economic 
development. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that the location-choice 
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of foreign investment in Asia, unless it is heavi ly weighed by 
minera l resources which involves high t ranspor ta t ion f rom one 
country to another, would largely follow the human development 
i n d e x in r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s , in t h e e r a of g l o b a l t r a d e 
l ibera l i sa t ion . A higher level of human deve lopment not only 
supports an expanded output market , but a lso ensures higher degree 
of technology adaptabil i ty of the workers, in general , and the small 
scale/anci l lary units, in part icular . 
In India, there is a wide varition in human development across 
the states. The statewise distribution of birth and death rates shows 
that all the states are going through the demographic t ransi t ion, 
with both birth rates and death rates dropping steadily. T h e pace 
of change from 1985 onwards is especially rapid. Whi le the decline 
in the death rates owes to the improvement of sanitat ion and public 
health system that in birth rates certainly to the access of the people 
to education. We have summarized in Table 4 some of the indicators 
of the level of human development in order to locate the relat ive 
position of West Bengal among the 25 states in India. On the whole, 
West Bengal performance-wise certainly belongs to the category of 
relat ively poor states. As to the number of pr imary health centres, 
West Bengal ' s position is relatively better. But if that is compared 
to, say, the position in respect of death ra tes or infant mortal i ty 
rates, the poor correlat ion would, for obvious reasons , put the 
qua l i ty of publ ic heal th sevices in ques t ion . Tha t th is is not 
unwarranted is amply evident from the fact that West Bengal stands 
behind 17 other states as regards the per capi ta publ ic heal th 
e x p e n d i t u r e , or b e h i n d 23 s t a t e s as r e g a r d s the per c a p i t a 
expendi ture on water supply and sani tat ion, in 1991-92. Similarly, 
in respect of per capita expendi ture on educat ion (revenue and 
capital account combined) West Bengal ' s rank is 20th. She has 
even excelled 22 other states in the event of school drop out rate. 
Here again, one may question the quality of education which perhaps 
would explain the high rate of drop outs. However, the latter is 
usual ly related to the economic cond i t ions of l iv ing , and that 
prompts us to carefully examine the agr icul tural per formance of 
the state. 
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T a b l e 3 
P o p u l a t i o n , d e m o g r a p h y , l i fe e x p e c t a n c y , h e a l t h , 
a n d e d u c a t i o n in s e l e c t e d c o u n t r i e s 
Item India Indonesia Phil ippines Malaysia Korea Singapore 
1. Avg. annual growth rate 
of popula t ion (%) 
1 9 6 5 - 7 3 2 .3 2.1 2 . 9 2 . 6 2 . 2 1 .8 
1 9 7 3 - 8 3 2 .3 2 . 3 2 . 7 2 . 4 1 .6 1.3 
2. Crude death rate per 
1 , 0 0 0 popula t ion 
1965 2 0 2 0 12 12 11 6 
1 9 8 5 12 12 8 6 6 5 
3 . Li fe e x p e c t a n c y at 
birth ( y e a r s ) 
M a l e 1965 46 4 3 5 4 5 6 5 5 6 4 
1 9 8 5 57 5 3 61 6 6 65 7 0 
F e m a l e 1965 44 45 5 7 6 0 5 8 6 8 
1 9 8 5 56 57 6 5 7 0 7 2 75 
4 . Infant morta l i ty rate 
(aged < = 1 year) 
(per t h o u s a n d l ive 
births in - ) 1965 151 138 7 2 55 6 3 26 
1 9 8 5 89 9 6 4 8 28 27 9 
5 . Populat ion per phys ic ian 
1 9 6 5 4 , 8 8 0 3 1 , 7 0 0 - 6 , 2 0 0 2 , 6 8 0 1 , 9 0 0 
1 9 8 4 2 . 5 2 0 9 , 4 1 0 6 , 5 7 0 1 , 9 3 0 1 , 1 6 0 1 . 4 1 0 
6 . No. enro l l ed in s c h o o l 
as % a g e o f age group : 
Pr imary 1965 74 72 113 9 0 101 105 
1985 92 118 106 9 9 9 6 115 
S e c o n d a r y 1 9 6 5 27 12 41 28 35 45 
1985 35 3 9 65 5 3 9 4 71 
Source : World Development Report (various i s sues) 
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Tab le 4 
H u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t : West Benga l vis-a-vis o t h e r s t a t e s 
Rank 
Year (among 25 states) 
1. Per capita public health 
expendi ture 1975-76 2 0 
1991-92 18 
2. Number of primary health centres 1980 7 
1992 5 
3. Persons per bed in hospital 1974 9 
1989 15 
4. Per capita state government 
expenditure on water supply 
and sanitation 1975-76 23 
1991-92 24 
5 . Death rates (per ' 0 0 0 ) 1979-81 13 
1989-91 9 
6. Infant mortality rate 
(per ' 0 0 0 live birth) 1981 9 
1991 9 
7. Literacy rate (literate 
population as a percentage of total 
pop. aged 7 yrs & above) 1981 12 
1991 11 
8. Drop out rates (%) 1988 -1989 cl. I - V 23 
cl. I - VIII 23 
9. Per capita state govt , expenditure 
on education (revenue & capital 
a/c combined) : 1975-76 16 
1991-92 20 
Source : CMIE, Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian 
Economy : States, September 1993. 
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Table 5 
A g r i c u l t u r e in West Benga l 
In West Bengal R a n k o f W e s t B e n g a , 
out of 25 states 
1. Annual rate of increase of foodgrains 
production during 1970-73 - 1989-92 • 
2 . 5 6 % (A.I : 2 .69%) 
7 
2. Per capita foodgrains production. 1989-92 
175 kgs. (A.I : 203 kgs) 8 
3 . Gross irrigated area as percentage of GCA 
1 9 8 9 - 9 0 — 2 2 . 9 % (A.I : 32.9%) 
12 
4. Irrigated area as percentage of total area 
under rice, 1988 -89 - 22.2% (A.I : 44 .77 0 ) 
15 
5. Area under H Y V as percentage of total area 
under rice, 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 - 49 .6% (A.I : 60 .7%) 11 
6. Per capita (Rural) income from agriculture 
1 9 7 0 - 7 3 : Rs. 4 1 4 (A.I : Rs. 3 8 4 ) 
1 9 8 6 - 8 9 : Rs. 1.264 (A.I : Rs. 1 .302) 
6 
12 
Source : CMIE (as under Table 4) 
Notes : A.I. = All-India 
A few indicators, as arranged in Table 5, show that West Bengal 
in genera l , lagged behind the agricultural growth per formance in 
some other states, and also the all-India average, over the last two 
decades. To the extent human development is related to the per 
c ap i t a i n c o m e of the pupu la t ion , the r e l a t i v e l y poor h u m a n 
development in the state is self-evident. Notwi ths tanding , so far as 
human development corresponds to command over resources needed 
tor a decent l iving, income indictor is only a par t ia l measure One 
s h o u l d a l s o c o n s i d e r the d i m i n i s h i n g / i n c r e a s i n g r a t e of 
t ransforming income into human capabili t ies which is related to 
among others, the forms or development of the credit and output 
markets . For instance, if a producer had to fall back upon the 
informal credit market for borrowing at a rate of interest which is 
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much h ighe r than the rate of re turn he /she yie lds out of the 
investment of the borrowed capital, the choice gets narrowed down13 
( w h e r e a s h u m a n deve lopment is supposed to be a p rocess of 
enlarging people ' s choice). Similarly, if the output market did not 
rcflcct the demand condit ions, or the supply condi t ions either, the 
p u b l i c p r o v i s i o n for t r a i n i n g a n d m a n p o w e r d e v e l o p m e n t 
p rogrammes for the poor would fail to accelerate the dif fusion of 
improved technology, since the adoption does not seem to be a 
r a t i o n a l c h o i c e to the user . Tha t the ou tpu t m a r k e t s in the 
h in ter lands are still considerably discriminatory have been analysed 
in the case of not-so-generalised commodit ies like silk (Baner jee , 
1990, 1994), and even in such general ised commodit ies as rice 
(Palaskas and Harris - White, 1993). Strikingly, as it is revealed 
in the latter study, the prices in the rice markets in Bardhainan, 
Katwa and Memari all in the agricul tural ly most advanced distr ict 
of Bardhaman in West Bengal does not show a converging trend; 
var ia t ions in physical infrastructure and in information costs, by 
themselves cannot explain the lack of integration {ibid). 
One may argue that the size of the population is par t icular ly a 
drag on the resources of the state. Statistically, the annual ra te of 
growth of population between 1981 and 1991, in part icular, in West 
Bengal was 2.4 per cent; a rate which exceeded the al l-India averge 
by 0.1 per cent. But, so to say, Maharashtra or Haryana or Uttar 
Pradesh (excluding the Union Terri tories) had a greater ra te of 
populat ion growth. Secondly, the pupulation density in 1981 was 
highest in Kerala, among the 25 states. But due par t icular ly to the 
l i teracy programme and improvement in the public health system 
that the population growth rate in Kerala became the lowest (1.3 
per cent) in India, during 1981-91. In fact, in almost all the states 
which improved upon human development during the period had 
also experienced a lower rate of population growth. The current 
popula t ion control programme either ignores this aspect of the 
human development programme, or pays only a token at tention to 
it. Thirdly, the population in West Bengal in 1991 consti tuted 8.04 
per cen t of the n a t i o n a l a g g r e g a t e which c e r t a i n l y is qu i t e 
" If public health system fails and one has to buy the costlier private health care the 
welfare implications of increased income would be similar. 
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s i g n i f i c a n t . Yet that pe rhaps would not exp la in the low key 
management of human development in West Bengal, since Uttar 
Pradesh with 16.44, Maharashtra with 9.3, Andhra Pradesh with 
7.86, or Tamilnadu with 6.60 per cent of the a l l - India populat ion 
has performed relatively better on account of human development . 
On the whole . The Government of West Bengal have schemes 
whatsoever of human development but perhaps due to the general 
lack of motivation those have hardly translated into a real growth. 
It is par t icular ly a larming to find that the committee set up by the 
Union Human Resource Development Ministry to review various 
schemes under the In tegra ted Chi ld Deve lopment P r o g r a m m e 
(ICDP), in its report (as quoted and reported in The Telegraph, 25 
February 1995) ment ions that while the overall per formance of all 
the states and Union Terri tories which were sanctioned Rs. 870.99 
crores under the ICDP, had not been very satisfactory, the work 
done in West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa was 'd isappoint ing and 
disastrous ... Not only have their performances been disappoint ing, 
but in several cases, the funds released to these (West Bengal, Bihar 
and Or i s sa ) gove rnmen t s have not been proper ly u t i l i s ed ' . To 
conclude, this compara t ive disadvantage in the field of human 
development is likely to hinder capital inflow in West Bengal . 
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